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The purpose of the writing 11Li terary Paradoxes in the Philosophi- -
cal Fragments of S~ren Aabye Kierkegaard, 11 is to exhibit the paradoxes 
used in the Philosophical Fragments as well as to indicate techniques of 
deception employed by Kierkegaard for the purpose of shocking the reader 
into contemplation. 
Philosophical Fragments was chosen to point out the use of para-
doxes in Kierkegaard's authorship because it is indicative of the whole 
Kierkegaardian problem of what it means to become a Christian. 
Data was gathered by reading the primary writings of the author 
as well as commentaries on his life and work by his translators and 
biographers . 
Quotations from Kierkegaard 's Point of View were used to estab-
lish instances in which Kier kegaard admitted of the technique of de-
ceptiono It was as sumed that, since he was capable of ad..rnitted deception, 
he was very likely to have used deception which was not admitted but in-
dicated by the nature of his authorship and personal mode of existence. 
In order to exhibit the paradoxes in a manner which would indicate 
to the reader the relationship of paradoxes, deception techniques used to 
attract attention, and the point of the authorship as a whole, Philo-
sophical Fragments was summarized. Major paradoxes were quoted and 
apparent deceptions were pointed out as they appeared in context. A 
pattern was observed in the paradoxical relationships of three which 
Kierkegaard made use of in his discourse. The progression of the re-
lationship pattern was indicated and found to be important in the 
exhibition of the paradoxes and in the relationship of Kierkegaard to 
his reader o 
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In conclusion it was affirmed that Kierkegaard in approaching his 
reader used the method of shock by means other than those which he ad-
mitted being author to and that he was capable of deception as a deliber-
ate technique . It was reiterated that the method of deceit was carried 
farther than his admission and renia.ined for the reader to discover. 
Diagrams which exhibit the pattern of Kierkegaard's paradoxical 
relationships vrere shown for the purpose of clarifying the relationships 
for the reader. Paramount in the conclusion is Kierkegaard 1 s assertion 
that the learner is not asked to understand the paradox but only to 
recognize it. 
As a final conclusion, Kierkegaard is named as the purveyor of 
truth in a paradoxical relationship invol-"ing his reader at the lower 
end of the scale, Christ at the top of the scale as superior, with 
Kierkegaard as the central figure in the relationship with the task of 
giving the contradictories a means of understanding. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
S¢ren Aabye Kierkegaard's authorship deals with the question of 
what it means t o be a Christian. Kierkegaard, by his own admission, 
sought to attract attention to his writing by the sys tem used in the 
whole authorship. The Philosophical Fragments exposes aesthetically the 
problem involved in Christianity through the use of paradoxes . 
The purpose of this writing is t o exhibit the Kierkegaardian 
paradoxes in the Philosophical Fragments. Intrinsic to the problem is 
the additional technique of deception for the purpose of shocking the 
reader into cont emplation. The deception technique is also admitted by 
Kierkegaard. 
It is not intended to establish t_ at the paradoxes from the 
Kierkegaardian point of view are real. It is intended to show that the 
problem involved in Christianity is developed through paradoxes, that 
paradoxes are used as. illustrations, and that the paradoxical quality of 
Kierkegaard's life is involved in the authorship. 
The Philosophical Fragments is summarized to show the development 
of Kierkegaard's paradoxes and to indicate the evidences of the technique 
of deception in his interpretation of the problem of Christianity . 
Philosophical Fragments was chosen to point out the use of 
paradoxes in Kierkegaard's authorship because it forms a basis f or the 
whole Kierkegaardian problem of what it means to become a Christian. In 
addition, the relationship of t he paradoxes to the Absolute Paradox is 
made evident in Philosophical Fragmentso The Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript enlarges on the Philosophical Fragments and is i ncorporated 
into this writing to show the relationship i nvolved. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LIFE OF s¢REN AABYE KIERKEGAARD 
S¢ren Kierkegaard, who was born in Denmark in 1813, lived for 
forty-two years. During that time he became the forerunner of a form of 
philosophical thought which has been termed existentialism. His life 
appears to have influenced greatly the introspective thought processes 
which resulted in his writings . Kierkegaard's father, a wealthy man 
with extremely religious views, was responsible to a large extent for 
the moral and intellectual development of his son. As a boy, Kierkegaard 
was filled with the concept of duty which he never abandoned completely 
in spite of a later rebellion. He felt that his father had in his teach-
ing given him a part of the load of melancholy which was a part of his 
character . Kierkegaard expressed ambivalen viewpoints concerning the 
melancholy against which he was powerless to protest at the time of its 
inception. By the time he realized it, the quality of despair was inter-
woven into his life and is possibly responsible in part for his thoughts 
and writings . Although it is apparent that Kierkegaard resented his 
father's influence intensely, it seems that he may have been thankful 
during his most creative years for the power that was exerted over him by 
his father . 
The paradoxical character of Kierkegaard's relationship to 'his' 
reality is made evident from his reports of his early training. From 
this and l ater examples the question arises as to whether he planned that 
the evidence be interpreted as paradoxical to bear out the devices he 
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admits being author t o. That is, in addition t o his admitted deceptions, 
an over-all device developed from his whole life envelopes the whole 
authorship. From evidence gathered from his writings it appears that 
the device is not at all accidental. 
The stress which Kierkegaard lays on his unhappy childhood must 
also be understood in the sense that it was unhappy in its conse-
quences, though consciously it may have been relatively happy--and 
its happiness, again, lay in having received an immovable conviction 
that God is love. He was marked out for suffering from his earliest 
years. And when he wrote that 'everyone is essentially what they 
are t o be when they are ten years old' he was speaking quite literally 
about himself. All the major factors in his life he traced back to 
his childhood • • .1 
That Kierkegaard attempted for a time to escape the quality of 
inborn dread which he experienced is evidenced in this statement: 11 There 
was a time when, f or fear of being proud of my suffering, I put forward 
the noti on that at bottom all men suffered equally. Yet fundamentally 
that is only a kind of stoicism, which in its abstraction does away with 
the more concrete belief in providence . 1t 2 
In addition to philosophy and theology, Kierkegaard was interested 
in art, literature and the theatre . He studied at the University of 
Copenhagen at a time when Hegelianism was popular . For a while during 
this period in his life he devoted himself to the pleasures of the world, 
but soon abandoned them in disgust and became even more studious . 3 
1 The Journals of S¢ren Kierkegaard, Alexander Dru, editor and 
translator::- (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p •. DC •. f .. 
2 Ibid., p. 112 f. 
J Frederick Mayer, A Histor~ of Modern Philosophy. (New York: 
American Book Company, 1951),, Po 4 3. 
When Kierkegaard was twenty-five an event occurred which was re-
ferred to by him as 1 the great earthquake. ' 
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••• the great earthquake occurred, the terrible revolution which 
suddenly forced upon me a new and infallible law of interpretation 
of all the facts . Then I suspected that my father's great age was 
not a divine blessing but rather a curse; that the outstanding 
intellectual gifts of our family were only given to us in order that 
we should rend each other to pieces ••• There must be a guilt upon 
the whole family, the punishment of God must be on it; it was to 
disappear, wiped out by the powerful hand of God, obliterated like 
an unsuccessful attempt, and only at times did I find a little al-
leviation in the thought that my father had been allotted the heavy 
task of calming us with the consolation of religion, of ministering 
to us so that a better world should be open to us even though we lost 
everything in this world • • • what wonder then that in desperate 
despair I grasped at nought but the intellectual side in man and 
clung fast to it, so that the thought of my own considerable powers 
of mind wap my only consolation, ideas my one joy, and mankind indiffer-
ent to me.4 
The year following Kierkegaard's 'great earthquake' was the 
turning point in his life. He became reconciled with his father, re-
corded the most profound religious experien~e in his life and his father 
died unexpectedly. Two years later he became engaged to Regine Olsen but 
he broke the engagement the next year. The stir of opposition which de-
veloped as a result overwhelmed Kierkegaard and he went to Berlin where he 
listened to the lectures of Schelling and became engrossed with the spirit 
of German philosophy. 5 
Kierkegaard never forgot Regina. To him she became the symbol of 
loveliness~ • • and yet he was happy to be free and not tied down by 
the obligations of marriage. Here we have a strange paradox in his 
character • •• He wanter Regina, and yet he wanted to be free; he 
wanted the security of marrigge, and yet he desired the independence 
of the solitary philosopher. 
4 The Journals of S¢ren Kierkegaard, £E• cit. , p. 66f. 
5 Mayer, .£E• cit. , p. 464. 
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The paradox which Mayer pointed out in Kierkegaard's character 
concerning marriage versus independence is hardly uncommon. However, 
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the use of the paradox is possibly another method by which the interest 
of the reader is aroused. Furthermore, in employing the use of the 
incident in his background, Kierkegaard is able to say that he is 
perfectly aware of what love is and can therefore believeably parallel a 
common human experience with an uncommon religious experience. His re-
nunciation of love is a release which left him free to carry out that 
which he felt was his purpose and which could hardly fail to attract the 
attention of the reader;· for who but a selfless and dedicated man would 
deny himself happiness for the sake of mankind? And would mankind listen 
as closely to one who did not deny hiw~elf for its sake? If Kierkegaard 
erred ethically in using the story of his affair with Regina as a method 
of attraction, he appealed to the nature oi at least some readers. Here 
again, it would appear that in using his own paradox as an illustration, 
Kierkegaard found an attention arresting device. 
Another event which influenced Kierkegaard's life was a prolonged 
attack made upon him in The Corsair, a Danish newspaper, charging that 
he was weak in character and that his philosophy was full of fallacies. 
According to Mayer, his contempt for society was intensified as a result 
of the attack. 7 
In his mature years, Kierkegaard turned increasingly to religion. 
He wished to expose religious disintegration by showing that the Church 
7 Mayer, loc . cit. 
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of Denmark did not live up to the standards of Christ, that its members 
were living a worldly life, and that its theology was stereotyped and 
rationalistic . ttEssentially • • • Kierkegaard had only one thesis, that 
Christianity no longer exists."8 
He affirmed the majesty of God and considered man as a nothingness 
tortured by tensions and constant contradictions. He emphasized the 
personal relationship between man and God which transcends intellectual 
determinations and which can be grasped only through faith. 9 
ttBut he knew bis own limitations; in this lay his wisdom. To him 
truth was not an objective standard but an unending search, a subjective 
awareness . It was part of the Existentialist paradox. 1110 
In stating definitely and defiantly that Christianity no longer 
exists, Kierkegaard may be pointing out a non-paradoxical fact. The 
statement, however, does not necessarily elir ~nate any quality of paradox 
in his total writing. From a statement that appears not to be a paradox 
he builds a case which involves paradox and climaxes the case with an 
interpretation called the Absolute Paradox. But in saying that Christi-
anity no longer exists, a previous existence is implied; and if Christi-
anity did exist and can exist again it could not have been completely 
dead in the interval between or else it would never have really existed 
in the beginning. If it had been considered dead, something would have 
8 Miller , Henry, 11 Review of A Short Life of Spren Kierkegaard by 
Walter Lowrie," New Republic, 108:642, (:V.ia.y 10, 1943), p. 642. 
9 Mayer, op . cit . , p . 467 . 
10 Loe. cit. -- --
to remain alive for the purpose of rejuvenation. Kierkegaard himself 
points out a similar progression in the Philosophical Fragments in in-
terpreting the process of becoming a Christian, so it would appear that 
the statement that Christianity no longer exists may well be a shock 
treatment for the reader. 
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Notable in Kierkegaard's contribution to philosophic literature is 
his delineation of various stages which characterize man's progress toward 
fulfillment and perfection. The stages chronologically in existence are 
aesthetic, ethical and religious. The aesthetic man is evidenced not only 
by his search for temporal pleasure but also by his giving up the search 
for enjoyment and becoming sceptical regarding pleasure. The ethical man 
realizes that external goods are insignificant and concentrates on the 
development of his inner capacities. The religious man realizes the 
depth of the gulf that separates him from Gcu. He is tortured by a 
sense of guilt which arises mainly from a sense of inadequacy which can 
be extended to humanity as a whole. Man contains two parts--one secular 
and one spiritual; one devoted to the present and one which lives for the 
future . 11 
The qualities of the secular or aesthetic and spiritual parts of 
man are the basis of the arrangement of the whole authorship of Kierkegaard. 
At the climax of his literary life he published The Point£!: View, which 
clarified his purpose and method as an author and admitted the authorship 
of all the books which had formerly been published under pseudonyms. 
11 Miller, op . ci·t p 471 f _ ., . . 
Kierkegaard probably did not consider himself or anyone else 
totally capable of being ideally aesthetic, ethical or spiritual. Be-
sides , in using the aesthetic and ethical stages as steps toward the 
spiritual state, they could hardly be discounted as lacking in value 
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and being insignificant despite the indication that man is spiritually 
out of existence when he is in them. This problem, too, is involved in 
the process of becoming. Again by using apparently positive statements 
in definition, is Kierkegaard attracting attention to his total thesis? 
That is, even that which appears at first glance to be unparadoxical can 
be found to be paradoxical but by virtue of the apparent lack of paradox, 
the reader is given a positive reaction for a time. The reaction has 
essentially the same effect as the statement that Christianity no longer 
exists . 
CHAPTER III 
THE POINT OF vmr 
In introducing The Point of View Kierkegaard wrote, nrn my career 
as an author, a point has now been reached where it is permissible to do 
what I feel a strong impulse to do and so regard as my duty--namely, to 
explain, once for all, as directly and frankly as possible ••• what I 
as an author declare myself to be.nl 
Kierkegaard admitted a duplicity in the whole authorship as to 
whether he was an aesthetic or a religious author and stated his in-
tention of pointing out the duplicity. He discounted any supposition 
that he was an aesthetic author changed to a religious author since such 
an author would never have issued The Point of View at the time Either/Or 
was being republished. Either/Or demonstrated t he duplicity of 
Kierkegaard's authorship through the championship of the aesthetic 
viewpoint on one hand and, conversely, the viewing of life as a moral 
2 process . 
Here, Kierkegaard in explaining the arrangement of his authorship, 
leaves no room for doubt as to his purpose. But if he can separate the 
aesthetic life and the moral life so easily, it would seem that no con-
fusion would be probable in explaining the problem of becoming a 
1 Siren Aabye Kierkegaard, The Point~ View. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1950), p. 5. 
2 Frederick }'fayer, A History of Modern Philosophy. (New York: 
American Book Company, 1951), p . 460. 
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Christian. Actually the paradox must remain in the separation of aes-
thetic and spiritual existence. If both did not exist in one man it 
would seem that he would be unfamiliar with one or the other and if both 
exist in one man, how can such a separation be possible? Kierkegaard 
points out the duplicity. 
The duplicity started with the beginning of his authorship. Con-
temporaneous with Either/Or was Two Edifying Discourses, which was un-
deniably a religious work. After two years during which religious works 
only were published, an aesthetic article, The Crisis and A Crisis in 
the Life of~ Actress , was published designed to eliminate any possi-
bility of attempting to prove that the author changed f rom an aesthetic 
to a religious writer . 11 •• • for he was a religious author from the 
beginning and was aesthetically productive even at the last moment. 113 
The first group of writings represent 3 aesthetic productivity, the 
last group is exclusively religious: between them, as the turning-
point, lies the Concluding Postscript . This work concerns itself 
with and sets 1 the Problem,' which is the problem of the whole 
authorship: how to become a Christian. ·· 
The Concluding Unscientific Postscript was not classified as either 
aesthetic or religious . Although it was published under a pseudonym, 
Kierkegaard appended his name as editor. Following the Concluding 
Postscript only religious works under his own name were published. Then 
he published Inter et Inter, an aesthetic article by a pseudonym. "This,n 
he said, 11 is calculated to make one conscious all at once of the 
3 Kierkegaard, op. cit . , p. 13 . 
4 Loe. cit. -- --
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authorship as a whole . 11 5 
The aesthetic ethical, religious relationship can not be othersise 
than paradoxical. It is not likely that Kierkegaard failed to be aware 
of it. In writing the Point of View it may well be that he is using a 
literary device based on actuality of the paradoxo That is, where the 
paradox of his authorship appears to be merely literary, the paradox 
remains undisolvable underneath, and although in the explanation the 
paradox seems to be ignored, it is possible that he expected it to be-
come even more evident. 
Kierkegaard in The Point of View admitted that a protestation by 
him that he was consistently a religious author should be enough but 
since he had little confidence in protestations with respect to literary 
productions he was inclined to take an objective view of his own work 
which he termed dialectical. 
However, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard 
discounts objectivity in favor of subjectivity. Since his whole point 
of view is based on subjective awareness, is it possible for him to take 
an objective view toward his ovm writings? And in stating that he is 
inclined to take such a view is it possible that he is again forcing his 
reader to take notice of his point of view? It is possible that by in-
viting his reader to quarrel with his apparent inconsistencies, he 
further accomplishes his purpose--to attract the reader's attention. If 
this is the case, Kierkegaard's pretense uses the merely literary 
5 Ibid. , p. 14 
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paradox to force the real paradox to the front where it cannot be put 
down as a dialectic argument only. Besides by ignoring the formal rules 
of reasonj_ng he must be indicating a purpose for the deception. It is 
obvious that he is not ignorant of the rules. It is also to be con-
sidered that outright logical contradiction is not the only form of 
paradox. There are incompatibles that are not contradictories~ 
Since Kierkegaard has pointed out the ambiguity which was present 
from beginning to end, the thing which remains to be explained is the 
employment of aesthetics to introduce religion. That the aesthetic pro-
ductions appear to have been used as a literary tool to attract attention 
to the religious work is evidenced by the statement: nr held out 
Either/Or to the world in my left hand, and in my right the Two Edi-
fying Discourses but all, or as good as all, grasped with their right 
what I held in my left. 116 
He was aware, he said, that only a few understood the Two Edi-
fying Discourses . In the preface to Two Edifying Discourses appeared 
his first dedication to his reader, 1 the individual 1 which may have been 
an additional means used to bring his writings to the attention of more 
people by anticipating a subjective identification with Kierkegaard 1s 
1individual . 1 This would indicate that Kierkegaard was capable of a 
technical deception for an end held to be goodo 
By the act of dedicating his work to 1 the individual, 1 he was 
assured of more readers . If only 1 the individual' alluded to by 
6 Ibid., p. 20 . 
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Kierkegaard possessed the capacity to understand his authorship there 
would have been no point in employing any deception at all. But by im-
par ting a special -quality to those who were supposed to be in accordance 
with him he drew more readers who would wish to be included in t ha t cate-
gory. Their reading of hirr1 would be given more purpose even though the 
purpose was superficial. 
Kierkegaard confided that he was potentially as deeply under the 
influence of religion when he began Either/Or as he had ever been. 
I was so deeply shaken (!:eference to the affair with Reginru that 
I understood perfectly well that I could not possibly succeed in 
striking the comforting and secure via media in which most people 
pass their lives; I had either to cast myself into perdition and 
sensual ity, or to choose the religious absolutely as the only thing--
either the world in .a measure that wou_1d be dreadful, or the cloister.7 
As a further clarification of the aesthetic-religious approach, 
Kierkegaard referred to Christendom as a prodigious ilJ.usion. Christendom 
for Kierkegaard was the Christianity practiced in Denmark which he con-
sidered to be weak and passionless . 11 There is nothing,n he said, rtthat 
requires such gentle handling as an illusion, if one wishes to dispel it. 118 
A religious writer must, therefore, get in touch with men aesthetically 
and approach an illusion, which can never be destroyed directly, from 
behind the person who is under an illusion. I nstead of protesting that 
one is an extraordinary Christian he should attack Christendom by de-
claring that he is not a Christian at all. 9 Kierkegaard used such an 
7 Ibid., p. 18. 
B Ibid., p. 25 . 
9 Ibid., p. 2~. f . 
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approach in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in which the pseudony-
mous author, Johannes Climacus, declared that he was no Christian. This 
appears to be another deception employed by Kierkegaard as a psycho-
logical technique. 
The religious writer whose concern is how one is to become a Chris-
tian starts off rightly as an aesthetic writer. The harm is not great in 
pretending not to be a Chris t ian as is the harm involved when one who is 
not a Christian pretends to be one. 
ltLife,u Kierkegaard repeats, ttis divided into two parts: the period 
of youth belongs to the aesthetical; the later age to religion.nlO 
Stemming from this view point is an error destructive to religiousness; 
that is, the idea that if one could remain young, one would not have any 
need for Christianity or religion. Such an idea may contribute to es-
tablish the illusion more firmly and the only help for it is to t ake steps 
to dispel the illusion. If a religious author is concerned wi t h dealing 
with the illusion he must be simultaneously an aesthetic and a religious 
author. The religious works remain only a method of comrnunicat ion.ll 
Although it is impossible for a person to be compelled to accept an 
opinion, a conviction or a belief, he can be compelled to take notice.12 
"Compelling people to take notice and t o judge is the Characteristic of 
lO Ibid., p. 31. 
ll Ib.d __ i_., p. 31 f • . 
12 Ibid., p. 35. 
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genuine martyrdom. 1113 
This statement indicates that Kierkegaard felt that people could 
be compelled to take notice and consequently to judge. Perhaps his im-
plied feeling of martyrdom was a result of his giving himself as well as 
his authorship to the world. In any case it appears that he felt that 
people must be compelled to take notice . Knowing this who can say to 
what ends he f elt he could go in order t o compel the attention? 
Kierkegaard began his deception designed to cause people to take 
notice by accepting the other man 's illusion • 
• • • the aesthetic work is a deception, and herein is to be found 
the deeper significance of the use of pseudonyms ••• One must not 
let oneself be deceived by the word 'deception.' One can deceive a 
person for the truth's sake and ••• one can deceive a person into 
the truth. Indeed, it is only by this means ••• triat it is possible 
to bring into the truth one who is in an illusion.14 
As was formerly stated, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
constituted the turning point in the authorship and presented the problem 
of becoming a Christian. In regard to the religious group included in 
the whole authorship, Kierkegaard assumed that no explanation was neces-
sary t hus establishing the point of view. 15 
Kierkegaard carried his deception into his mode of existence 0 
During the period preceding the publication of Either/Or he made every 
effort to be seen every hour of the day. Copenhagen was convinced by 
his actions that he was an idler and a dawdler and entirely lacking in 
13 Loe. cit. 
l4 Ibid., p. 39 f. 
15 Ibid., p. wJ_ f. 
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seriousness although brilliant and wi tty. With the compl etion of the 
Concluding Postscript, Kierkegaar d changed his personal masquerade . 
According t o his version of the affair of The Corsair, he deliberately 
eArposed himself t o cari cature by the newspaper and became a laughingstock 
in Copenhagen intentionally . The Corsair' s attack benefit ed Ki er kegaard's 
scheme f or posing as a reli gious author for when he, as a religious author, 
was asked on what grounds he based hi s claim that he was right he would 
answer, 11 I pr ove it by the fact that I am persecuted; t his is t he t r ut h, 
and I can prove it by the f act that I am derided. 11 16 
Again Ki erkegaard has i gnored the rules of formal reasoning in 
making the above statement. In addition, he has made another allusion 
to his martyrdom. It appears that he was more concerned with the eff ect 
produced by his statement upon the r eader t han t he accuracy of his logi c . 
If this is true it must be another deception. 
Kierkegaard ' s self-imposed isolation appears to have stemmed from 
the period in which he accepted the ur ge which compell ed him t o produce 
his writings and t o which he r eferred as t he ' gr eat earthquake . ' However, 
his feel ing of bei ng an observer r ather t han a participant in human ac-
t i vity he felt was a part of him from chi l dhood. 11 The thought goes very 
f ar back i n my r ecollection, 11 he sai d, 11 that i n ever.f gener ation there 
are t wo or three who are sacri ficed f or t he other s , ar e led by f r i ghtful 
sufferings t o discover what redounds to the good of others .17 He 
16 Ibid., p. 59. 
17 Ibid., P • 79. 
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understood himself to be one of those singled out in his generation. He 
apparently knew of the exile which he would assUJne later at the time he 
experienced the ' great earthquake . ' During that period he wrote, "The 
hUJnorist, like a beast of prey, always walks alone . 1118 
If Kierkegaard was as miserable as he seems to be inclined to lead 
his reader to believe it appears that he genuinely enjoyed it. Did he use 
his melancholy to arous e the reader's sympathy and empathy? If this is 
the case is it not one of the most obvious and clever of his deceptions? 
The comedian who employs pathos is among the most favored of comedians . 
The reader who is sympathetic to the man if not to his words is very 
likely to read. Too, the reader who is laughing is still reading. If 
this is a device then it would reach those who were not necessarily in 
accord 1dth him as well as those who were . 
18 The Journals of Spren Kierkegaard, op. ~ ., p. 56. 
CHAPTER IT 
THE PARADOXES IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 
The Philosophical Fragments deals with the problem of Christianity 
with emphasis upon the relationship of man to God based upon the immediacy 
of the point in time when the relationship becomes apparent and undenia-
ble. In the preface Kierkegaard makes the statement that the writing is 
a piece for its own sake with no pretension to share in the philosophi-
cal movement of the day or to fill any of the various roles customarily 
assigned in the philosophical connection. He approaches and explains 
the problem throughout by the use of paradoxes. 
In saying that Philosophical Fragments is a piece for its own sake, 
Kierkegaard may be approaching the illusion from behind as he said one 
must in the Point of View. Certainly in dealing with the problem aes-
thetically as he admits doing, and by condoning the use of deception it 
is clear that he intended to put the practice to use. Therefore, the use 
of paradoxes in explaining the paradoxical relationship between man and 
God may well be a literary device. By his own statement we know that he 
considers himself a humorist . In paralleling the humorist to the beast 
of prey it could be interpreted that he is preying on Christendom by 
approaching the illusion from behind. The prodigious illusion is in the 
process of being dispelled by the use of prodigious humor which is gently 
applied in order to startle the reader into contemplation and conse-
quently to realization. Such an interpretation leaves a question as to 
whether Kierkegaard considered that his paradoxes were actual. 
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Opinions have been advanced by some Kierkegaardian authorities 
that the use of paradoxes is an additional device used to attract at-
tention to his work and an implication t o that effect is made by Kierke-
gaard himself in his explanation of t he aesthetic and religious author-
ship in the Point of Vi ew. Guido de Ruggiero, professor of philosophy 
at the University of Rome, suggested that Kierkegaard 11aimed at disa-
vowing the dialectic mediation of contraries by affirming the immediate 
1 unity of these contraries, the coincidentia oppositorium, the paradox. 11 
The question of the use of par adoxes is not resolved, however, by assum-
ing that the use of paradoxes is a device only. 
In introducing the problem with which Philosophical Fragments is 
concerned Kierkegaard begins with a paradox involving the existence of 
Truth as something to be learned which evidently presupposes the non-
existence of Truth and makes it the object of an inquiry. The question 
brings to light a paradox which is apparently indisputable • 
• • • one cannot seek for what he knows , and it seems equally 
impossible for him to seek for wh2t he does not know. For what a 
man knows he cannot seek, since he knows it; and what he does not 2 know he cannot seek, since he does not even know for what to seek. 
Socrates eliminated the paradox by the doctrine of Recollection in 
which all learning and inquiry is interpreted as a kind of rememberingo 
In such a situation a teacher is onl y an instrument in the accident of 
remembering. If instruction is offered on any other basis it removes 
1 Guido de Ruggiero, Existentialism. (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1946) , p . 28 f . 
2 S¢ren Aabye Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fr agments . (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1936), p . S. 
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rather than adds to any benefit which the learner may gain., 11 • • • for 
it has never yet been kno~m to fail that one fool , when he goes astray, 
takes several others with him. n3 
However, with understanding of what it means to learn the Truth, 
the source of the instruction is only of historic or possibly poetic 
concern. If the Truth is within one and comes to light through oneself 
it is known from eternity without awareness of it and does nothing to 
eliminate the paradox from the Kierkegaardian point of view~ 
The temporal point of departure is nothing; for as soon as I 
discover that I have known the Truth from eternity irithout being 
aware of it, the same instant this moment of occasion is hidden 
in the eternal, and so incorporated with it that I cannot even 
find it so to speak, even if I sought it; because in my eternal 
consciousne~s there is neither here nor there, but only an ubique 
nusquam. 
Kierkegaard seems to imply that he, in his authorship, becomes 
the poetic or aesthetic means for his re der to discover the Truth; 
that is, he is the purveyor of the Truth. The Kierkegaardian paradox 
apparently exists, nevertheless, but it is possible that the paradox is 
used in this manner to convince his reader that anyone possesses the key 
to the truth within himself and the realization is released by the appli-
cation of thought provoked by the contemplation of the paradox. This 
relationship between the reader and Kierkegaard bears a relationship to 
the learner and Teacher in the approach to the Absolute Paradox. 
In employing the Socratic doctripe of recollection, Kierkegaard 
3 Ibid., P• 7. 
4 Ibid., p. 8. 
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strengthens the paradox concerned with the existence of Truth. He 
further enlarges upon the problem of the truth of Christianity in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript where he says concerning the objecti ve 
problem of the Truth of Christianity: 
The inq111r1ng subject must be in one or the other of two situa-
tions. Either he is in faith convinced of the truth of Christianity, 
and in faith assured of his own relationship to it; ••• Or the 
inquirer is ••• not i n an attitude of faith, but objectively in an 
attitude of contemplation, and henge not inf initely interested in 
the determination of the question. 
Kierkegaard employed many either/or comparisons in his authorship. 
The above example is one of them. The reader in applying the concepts to 
his own experience is likely to place himself in one category or the 
other. Each category leaves him vulnerable f or f urther contemplation either 
for the pur pose of clarifying his position in relation to Christianity or 
for strengthening his attitude of contemplation. The lack of middle 
ground concepts may clarify the apparently undisolvable quality of the 
paradox. Although the either/or assertions appear to be contradictory 
this does not necessarily mean that they are not true in fact . None of 
Kierkegaard's paradoxes· appear t o be disput able since t hey are contra-
dictory but the application of a compromise would weaken the contradic-
tion. Compromising, however, appears at first glance to be alien to 
Kierkegaard in relation to his reader. The reader is inclined t o suspect 
that Kierkegaard was not in fact convinced of permanent contradiction in 
his either/or tenets. 
5 Spren Aabye Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript . 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1944), p. 23. 
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The specul ative and subjective approaches to Christianity are 
considered by Kierkegaard. The speculative approach to the problem has 
no presumptions, he says, except that Christianity is assumed as given. 
11From the speculative standpoint, Christianity is viewed as an historical 
phenomenon. The problem of its truth therefore becomes the problem of 
so interpenetrating it with thought, that Christianity at last reveals 
itself as the eternal truth. 116 
The subjective approach is considered by Kierkegaard as the most 
decisive step in becoming a Christian. In becoming essentially sub-
jective it is necessary to take the scope of the reflective presuppo-
sitions into accounto The subject must interpenetrate the presuppo-
sitions, throw off objectivity, and realize how infinite a conception he 
has of the significance of the change from objectivity to subjectivity, 
its responsibility and its limits. nrf the subject has not worked him-
self through and out of his objectivity, every appeal to another indi-
v-:i..dual will be merely a misunderstanding.,117 
In SUJT1.ming up the existence of Truth as something to be acquired, 
Kierkegaard states that: 11It is subjectivity that Christianity is con-
cerned with, and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it 
exists at all; objectively, Christianity has absolutely no existence.118 
The aesthetic, ethical and religious stages are proclaimed by 
6 Ibid. , p. 49 . 
7 Ibid. , p. 62 . 
8 Ibid., p. 116. 
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Kier kegaard to be the stages in the development of the religious man 
and the objecti ve, speculative and subjective approaches appear to be a 
parallel. Perhaps the ethical and speculative stages are a form of com-
prorr~se between the contradictory aesthetic and religious stages and 
the objective and subjective approaches . 
Kierkegaard states that in subjectivity only is the existence of 
Truth possible. Subjectivity is reached through objectivity and specu-
lation and objectivity and speculation are discarded when subjectivity 
is reached. 
This evolves back to the original paradox concerning man 's 
seeking of the Truth and the paradox seemingly remains actual in the 
speculative approach and questionable in the objective and speculative 
approaches in which the truth of Christianity is assumed. 
In the process of becoming a Christin the moment in time during 
which the truth is discovered must have decisive significance so that 
it will be irnpossible to forget . Concerning the antecedent state, 
Kierkegaard uses the Socratic thought that at bottom everyone possesses 
truth but must be destitute of truth up to the moment he learns it. 
Actually the seeker cannot be described as a seeker because he does not 
know that he seeks for Truth. He can only be described as being in a 
state of error . The teacher cannot help the learner to recall the truth 
as long as he is in error but the teacher can be responsible for giving 
the learner the occasion to remember that he is in error. The teacher 
must bring the Truth to the learner as well as the condition necessary 
for understanding it which is like the capacity to inquire for it; 
therefore, the condition contains the conditioned and the question im-
plies the answer . 
It is possible that the moment in time during which the truth is 
recognized is related to the ethical stage and the speculative approach 
and could be called a compromise between the contradictories of the 
learner in error and the learner in truth . Although the contradictories 
remain contradictory it is suspected that a relationship is possible 
with further contemplation. It seems that Kierkegaard in advancing 
contradictories softens them with explanations which leave the reader 
unsatisfied and still searching. Since the process occurs again and 
again with the middle category almost but not quite reasoning the contra-
dictories into juxtaposition, it appears that Kierkegaard had a pattern 
behind the groupings which, regardless of whether the paradoxes are 
actual, is used to bring the problem to l : 6ht. 
In so far as the learner exists he is already created, and hence 
God must have endowed him with the condition for understanding the 
Truth. .• • But in so far as the moment is to have decisive signifi-
cance ••• the learner is destitute of this condition, and must 
therefore have been deprived of it. This deprivation cannot have 
been due to an act of God, ••• nor to an accident ••• ; it must 
therefore be due to himself . 9 
11Error is then not only outside the Truth, but polemic in its 
attitude toward it •• 1110 . 11 The Teacher is then God himself, who in 
acting as an occasion prompts the learner to recall that he is in Error, 
and that by reason of his own guilt. 1111 
9 S. K. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op . cit . , p. 10. 
lO Loe . cit. 
11 Loe . ci t . 
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When the Teacher gives the learner who has brought upon himself a 
burden of guilt, the condition for understanding the truth as well as 
the truth, he takes away the wrath impending upon that of which the 
learner has made himself guilty and achieves an atonement. 
Here appears another pattern in relationship with the foregoing 
stages in which the learner and the teacher are connected with the con-
dition of guilt known to both. Upon becoming aware of the burden of 
guilt the learner approaches the position of the teacher while still 
remaining in his former position. 
In continuing the teacher-learner relationship Kierkegaard points 
out: 
Such a Teacher the learner will never be able to forget. For t he 
moment he forgets him he sinks back again into himself, just as one 
who while in original possession of th12conditi on forgot that God exists, and thereby sank into bondage. 
The foregoing statement appears t o be a truism r ather than a par a-
dox although it is paradoxical in character. I t corresponds, however, t o 
the other relationships in that the original stage is impossible to return 
t o once a more advanced stage is reached. 
The moment of truth which occurs at the time when a meeting is 
effected between the learner and the t eacher is tempor al and transient 
and necessarily decisive. The point t hat the learner becomes a disciple 
occurs at the onset of his realization of the moment. The moment is de-
fined as a change which takes place within the lear ner like the transition 
from non-being to being which can be termed as 'new birth.' 
12 Ibid., p. 12. 
27 
••• i f the moment has decisive significance the breach is made, 
and man cannot return. He will take no pleasure in remembering 
what Recollection brings to his mind; still less "hrilfahe be able in 
his own strength to bring God anew over to his side. 
By that token, after the moment has been attained, the question 
concerning the possibility of the learner sinking back again into him-
self is not a vital one unless the learner is able to hover on the brink 
of the moment for such a length of time that his progress is endangered 
and he begins a return to forgetting . A return would remove the learner's 
title of learner, however, and therefore would remove the paradox. 
Kierkegaard argues that a regression is impossible for as being born is 
t:hinkable to one who is born but not to one who is not born the same 
principle must also hold in the case of the new birth.14 
It appears that the statement is inadequate since, although being 
born implies a state of non-being before the birth, the new birth in-
dicates a state of being before the new birth. However, this may well 
be an oversimplification of the situation for the purpose of strengthen-
ing the parallel between this and the foregoing relationships. As an 
exarnple, one who is subjective finds objectivity thinkable as a stage 
toward subjectivity but not as a stage to be returned to while one who 
is objective, if he thinks of subjectivity at all finds it unattainable. 
Non-being and new birth, then, are connected by birth and new birth is 
inseparable from the first two stages. Kierkegaard continues to leave 
the reader in a state of seeking but the pattern of his progressions 
lJ Ib"d 11. _ _ i_. , p . Lj .• 
J.4 Loc o cito -- --
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becomes more apparent . There appears to be a certain solidarity im-
parted by the regularity of the pattern which may be a device used to 
give the reader confidence that eventually the apparent insolubility of 
the paradox will be given a non-contradictory- solution. 
In further enlarging upon the problem of Christianity , Kierkegaard 
introduces God as teacher and Savior in what he refers to as an essay of 
the imagination. 11 ••• the disciple gives occasion for the teacher to 
understand hirr~elf, and the teacher gives occasion for the disciple to 
understand himself. ul.5 Neither leaves any claim upon the other. 
God, however, needs no disciple to understand himself . The thing 
that moves God, since he is not moved by some need, is love which finds 
it satisfaction from within rather than without . "The Moment makes its 
appearance when an eternal resolve comes into relation with an incom-
mensurable occasion. 1116 
Again Kierkegaard takes advantage of a relationship of three. 
God and man are connected by love. Moved by love, God is eternally 
resolved to reveal himself . Love is his motive and the end for to have 
a motive without correspondence would be a contradiction. 
For it is only in love that the unequal can be made equal, and it 
is only in equality or unity that an understanding can be effected, 
and without a perfect understanding the Teacher is not God, unless 
the obstacle comes wholly from the side of the learner, in his re-
fusing to realize that which had been made possible for him. l7 
15 Ibid., p. 17 . 
16 Ibid., p. 18 . 
17 Ibid., p. 19 
There is, however, a kind of unhappy love which comes from the 
inability of the lovers to understand one another . The greater grief 
is the perogative of the superior since he alone understands the mis-
understanding. 
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The above quotation shows evidence that the paradox may be re-
solved. As in former examples, the disciple is ignorant or in error and 
through love, God reveals that man is in error. Man, finding the state 
of error inadequate, advances to equality with God. God understands the 
inequality just as the religious stage understand the aesthetic, the sub-
jective man understands the objective, and the teacher understands the 
learner. In all cases the contradictories are brought into progression 
toward elevation by a quality of learning in the least of the group. 
Also in all cases, once an elevation has been effected the least has no 
desire to return to its former state. Thus the entity endowed with 
understanding is the most concerned if an equality cannot be effected. 
In showing how an understanding between the teacher and the 
learner can be brought about, Kierkegaard advances the idea of the ele-
vation of the learner by God, but discards it because of the possibility 
of the learner being deceived by the outward change of his existence. 
The idea that the union might be brought about by God 's showing himself 
to the learner and receiving his worship is unsatisfactory because such a 
union could not satisfy the Teacher and possibly not the learner . 
Kierkegaard suggests that the only way that the union can be attempted 
is by descent and God, through love, desiring equality with the beloved 
descends to assume that equality. Such a solution requires greater 
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strength from the learner for 11 ••• it is indeed less terrible to fall 
to the ground when the mountains tremble at the voice of God, than to 
sit at table with him as an equal ••• 1118 
In the case of man and God corning together, man being unable to 
conceive of the relationship, is not able to approach the progression 
through reason and God, perceiving the enigmatic state of man, descends 
from the superior position to assist him. Thus it appears that God, like 
Kierkegaard, attacks the illusion from behind and after the disciple is 
goaded into speculation and the meaning of the truth by something inside 
him which he is unable to lLDderstB;-Dd, he is gently guided into a position 
of equality by the descent of his superior. If this is the case it 
appears that the paradox has been merged by the emotion of love which is 
the sole motive of the superior and in this instance, the learner, upon 
leaving his antecedent state understc1ds the gulf between the contra-
dictories and the greatness of the love which prompts the descent. The 
, realization gives the inferior an idea of how important he is to the 
superior. As Kierkegaard later states, the inferior knows self love. A 
firm foundation is given to the reader by the conception of the man-God 
relationship. It is very likely that a conceivable relationship here is 
advanced in order to renew the reader's faith that there is actually an 
unparadoxical solution to the problem of the truth of Christianityo 
Kierkegaard seems to have had vast insight into the temperament of his 
reader . Possibly he would have lost many readers at this juncture in 
18 Ibid. , p . 27 
31 
his discourse if the contradictories had no means of merging. At the 
point where the reader might well be satiated with paradoxes, Kierkegaard 
shows a meeting point between the most important relationships. That 
the connective is love and apparently emotional is importa..11.t. Knowing 
human nature he must have considered that it is easier to conceive of 
an emotion than to conceive of reason. In addition, the reader who must 
also be the learner is given comfort in J..mowing that the superior is 
willing to descend for his sake. It is interesting to note that in the 
relationship upon which depends the most strength from the inferior, he 
is given assurance of assistance. Kierkegaard has insured cooperation 
with God for his reader . 
From the explanation of the only possible union between the 
learner and the teacher, Kierkegaard advances into the Absolute Paradox 
which he subheads as a 'metaphysical c~otchet. 1 Concerning the paradox 
he says" • •• the paradox is the source of the t~inkers passion, and 
the think~r without a paradox is like a lover without feeling~ a paltry 
mediocrity. n19 
Kierkegaard seems to have written the above statement with a 
gently humorous aspect. He does, however, bring the statement into the 
reader 1s grasp in that fashion . He probably expected the reader to con-
sider that a lover without feeling would be unlikely to be a lover at all. 
Again there seems to be an inconsistency in his illustration which he 
probably did not overlook since he was admittedly a student of dialectic. 
19 Ibid., p . 29 . 
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The statement, however, appears to have a bearing upon the whole 
problem of the probability of the use of paradoxes as a mere literary 
technique. Although the paradox as a source of the thinker's passion 
appears to be actual since the thinker is likely to base thought upon 
conflict, the paradox as an end result in thought would result in only 
another paradox which might eventually become more unfortunate than the 
lover without feeling. Kierkegaard takes this into consideration by 
saying: 
But the highest pitch of every passion is always to will its own 
downfall; and so it is the supreme passion of the Reason to seek a 
collision, though this collision must in one way or another prove 
its undoing . The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to 
discover something that thought cannot think. The passion is at 
bottom present in all thinking, even in the thinking of the indi-
vidua.l, in so far as in thinking he participates in something 
transcending himself. co 
Knowing Kierkegaard's pattern of writing it may be that he uses 
the above illustrative paradox to return the reader to an attitude of 
thought. In the man-love-God relationship the reader may have become 
complacent in feeling that he will be taken care of spiritually if he 
only is receptive. The reader is jolted from his complacency by a new 
paradox which returns him to his attitude of contemplation by the intro-
duction of a new element. However, in saying that the individual in 
thinking, participates in something transcending himself, Kierkegaard 
seems to be saying that after self-love learned from the last relation-
ship, man has farther to go before the truth of Christianity can be 
lmown. Kierkegaard verbally beckons his reader to continue on the search 
2° Kierkegaard, loc. cit. 
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by arousing him to contemplate further . 
Man lives undis t urbed, he says, until the paradox of self-love 
awakens within him in the form of love for another. He is so trans-
formed by the love that he scarcely recognizes himself. Similarly the 
paradoxical passion of the Reason retroactively affects man and his self-
knowledge so that one who thought he knew himself cannot ascertain what 
he really is . 
This statement finishes the devastation of complacency that was 
begun by the above quotation. 
The with which the reason collides is unlmown and can be called 
God. No proof is possible . nFor if God does not exist it would of 
course be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be folly 
to attempt it. 1121 
Kierkegaard states that it is di~ficult to prove that anything 
exists and therefore to reason from existence rather than toward ex-
istence is. necessary. 
This clarifies for the reader, the relationships which give him a 
prominent place in the search for truth. Kierkegaard draws upon the 
individual's wish to identify himself with his outward ex:Lstence and 
then to transcend that existence through contemplation. 
In the process of thinking, Kierkegaard continues, reason re-
peatedly comes into collision with the unknown which is the limit. The 
unknovm is absol utel y different and cannot be distinguished otherwise . 
21 Ibid. , p. 31. 
Unless the unknown remains a mere limiting conception, the idea of 
difference is thrown into a state of confusion and will become many 
ideas of many differences . The unknown is then in a condition of dis-
persion and the reason may choose at pleasure from what is at hand. 
Here a new relationship begins in which the contradictories are 
Reason and the UnlrnoW11. 
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It is, however, according to Kierkegaard, impossible to hold fast 
to a difference of this nature because it is, when done, an arbitrary 
act. 
If no specific determination of difference can be held fast, 
because there is no distinguishing mark, like and unlike finally 
become identified with one another, thus sharing the fate of all 
such dialectical opposites. The unlikeness clings to the Reason 
and confounds it, so that the Reason no longer knows it~2lf and quite consistently confuses itself with the unlikeness. 
The first sentence in the above quotation illustrates the re-
jection of opposites used in Kierkegaard's relationships. For example, 
the religious stage is the result of the aesthetic and ethical stages 
and is ultimately involved in both. The aesthetic stage has the po-
tential of the religious stage within it and is inseparable from it by 
contradiction. In saying that holding to a difference is an arbitrary 
act does Kierkegaard tell his reader that the apparently paradoxical 
nature of his relationships only appears that way because of the way the 
reader looks at them? The reader and Kierkegaard become contradictories 
too as he probably planned it. 
In introducing the Absolute Paradox Kierkegaard presents an analogy 
22 Ibid. , p. 36. 
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related to the life of Christ. He says that an individual lives whose 
appearance is precisely like that of other men . He grows up, marries, 
has an occupation by which he earns his livelihood, and as befits a man 
he makes provision for the future . For although living as do the birds 
of the air may be beautiful it is not lawful or practical and may lead 
to starvation if one has enough persistence or dependence upon the 
bounty of others. 
This man is also God. How do I know? I cannot know it, for in 
order to know it I would have to know God, and the nature of the 
difference between God and man; and this I cannot know, because 
the Reason has reduced it to likeness with that from which it is 
unlike. Thus God becomes the most terrible of deceivers, because 
the Reason has deceived itself. The reason has 2~rought God as near as possible, and yet he is as far away as ever. 
The man and God relationship which has been connected through love, 
is annihilated when man must begin to reason. Man, Kierkegaard seems to 
say, has progressed far in self-love, b" tat best he is still very im-
perfect and reason brings man to this realization . God is a deceiver 
and in proving to his reader that such a device can be used for the ele-
vation of man, does Kierkegaard tell his reader that he, too, must de-
ceive in order to aid him? Divine deceit is not questioned and 
Kierkegaard deceives for a divine purpose . A paradox in the authorship 
arises here , for since Kierkegaard stated that he was attacking the 
illusion from behind, could the reader have been deceived? In reading 
he challenges the attack of his illusion and gives himself to the process 
of dispelling the illusion . As in the relationships, the reader, once 
23 Kierkegaard, loc . cit. 
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realizing that he is in error, becomes a Kierkegaardian disciple who is 
in turn ·divinely identified. Kierkegaard offers himself as a purveyor 
of Trutho However, in saying that he does not know God he is again 
identified with the reader as a learner faced with the attitude of 
reason. Here again is a technique which insures the reader's attention. 
By an apparently ambivalent identity, Kierkegaard keeps his reader in a 
state of contemplation which eliminates his dropping from the role of 
learner to a complacent acceptance of himself as either being unredeemably 
in a state of error or unquestionably in possession of the truth of 
Christianity. 
If God is absolutely unlike man then man is absolutely unlike God, 
which is more than the Reason can be expected to understand. However, 
merely to obtain the knowledge that God is unlike him, Man needs the help 
of God, and learns that God is absolutelu different from himself. The 
unlikeness must be explained by what man derives from himself, that is, 
sin. This. paradox, when coupled with an additional one, introduces the 
Absolute Paradox. Man becomes aware that he is in error through the 
consciousness of sin, which is made evident to hiln through the help of 
the Teacher . The consciousness of sin cannot be taught to one man by 
another but only by God- -or possibly the purveyor of God's teaching. In 
order to be man ' s Teacher, God proposed to make himself like the indi-
vidual man so that he might understand him fully . 
In the summary above, Kierkegaard clarifies the question for the 
sake of the reader . Too, he absolves himself from a divine identification 
by saying that the consciousness of sin cannot be taught to one man by 
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another . In pointj_ng out that he is in possession of knowledge of the 
nature of the difference he admits to being farther advanced on the scale 
of learning than those whose illusions he is involved in dispelling, but 
at the same time he points out that he is nevertheless in league with 
those whom he teaches. 
Kierkegaard, in proclaiming knowledge of the truth of Christianity 
and the process involved for those who learn it, seems to say that those 
who follow him will come closer to the truth. It should be noticed that 
he has never actually said that he is in possession of the truth but the 
ilnplication is present that the truth will be revealed to those who are 
not in possession of it by one who is. This device is an excellent one 
in holding the attention of the reader. The attitude of suspense which 
is generated furthers the interest of the reader. 
The Absolute Paradox, then, is pr oclaimed 11 • . , • neg a tj_ vely by 
revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin, positively by proposing to do 
away with .the absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness. 1124 
Kierkegaard here shows that the Absolute Paradox is proclaimed by 
a paradox. The relationship, however, can be interpreted to move in the 
direction of the superior as did the objective, speculative and subjec-
tive relationship. That is, sin, which is unlike, is approached by that 
which is like and a rejection is effected. The unlikeness is reduced 
while the essential unlikeness is still retained. So Kierkegaard, while 
proposing a paradox which appears to be different, returns to the 
2~- Ibid., p. 37 . 
relationship which he has consistently held. In seeming to be incon-
sistent he reveals a consistency thus again approaching the illusion 
from behind and startling the reader into contemplation. Such a tech-
nique is surely planned. 
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But can such a paradox be conceived? Let us not be over-hasty in 
replying; and since we strive merely to find the answer to a question, 
and not as those who run a race, it may be well to remember th~t suc-
cess is to the accurate rather than to the swift. The Reason will 
doubtless find it impossible to conceive it, could not of itself have 
discovered it, and when it hears it announced will not be able to un-
derstand it, sensing merely that its downfall is threatened. In so 
far the Reason will have much to urge against it; and yet we have on 
the other hand seen that the Reason, in its paradoxical passion, 
precisely desires its own downfall. But this is what the Paradox 
also desires, and thus they are at bottom linked in lL~derstanding; 
but this understanding is present only in the moment of passiono 
Consider the analogy presented by love, though it is not a perfect 
one. Self-love underlies love; but the paradoxical passion of self-
love when at its highest pitch 1nlls precisely its ovm downfall. 
This is also what love desires, so that these two are linked in 
mutual understanding in the passion of the moment, and this passion 
is love. Why should not the lover find this conceivable? But he who 
in self-love shrinks from the toucl of love can neither understand 
it nor summon the courage to venture it, since it means his do~mfall. 
Such is then the passion of love; self-love is indeed submerged but 
not annihilated; it is taken captive and becomes love's spolia opima, 
but may again come to life, and this is love's temptation. So also 
with the Paradox in its relation to the Reason, only that the passion 
in this case has another name; or rather, we must seek to find a name 
for it.25 
The above quotation further illustrates the whole relationship 
problem as advanced by Kierkegaard. That is, in issuing the contradictor-
ies, reason and the unknown, with reason desiring its own downfall , the 
objective, speculative, subjective approach is used again. More abstract 
in this instance, Reason, nevertheless, seeks to identify with the un-
known through a connective which understand both sides but which strives 
25 Ibid., p . 37 f . 
39 
toward the unlmown as a goal . Reas on, therefore, seeks its downfall 
through identity with the unlmown. The paradox, t oo, seeks downfall by 
striving for likeness. In saying that self-love is submerged but not 
annihilated by love, Kierkegaard must be showing his explanation of re-
lationships which have gone before . Too he points out to his contem-
plative reader that even such hopelessly contradictory elements as reason 
and the unlmown may become submerged in one another with progress toward 
the superior. 
Kierkegaard further discusses the Absolute Paradox by saying that 
if the paradox and the Reason come together in a mutual understanding of 
their unlikeness their encounter will be happy, but if the encounter is 
not in understanding the relationship becomes unhappy and the Reason is 
offended. The offended consciousness, however , is not discovered from 
Reas on but from the Paradox. It does nc'.:, understand itself but is under-
stood by the Paradox. Offense comes into being with the Paradox and the 
Moment occurs, upon which everything depends . That is, the Moment is the 
Paradox abbreviated. The offended consci ousness is a misunderstanding 
of the Moment since it is directed at the Paradox. The offended conscious-
ness holds aloof from the Paradox since the Paradox is the miracle but 
the discovery was made by the Paradox rather than the Reason . 1~nen the 
Reason is unable to understand the Paradox it is made evident by the 
Par adox. 
The Paradox becomes the connective in this case and like the 
speculative approach understands the objective approach while seeking for 
the subjective approach, the paradox understand the reason, the reason 
jumps to the paradox , if the encounter is a happy one, and Reason and 
Paradox united are prepared to leap to the third stage . If the under-
standing is not affected, the Reason is at fault and is actually still 
unprepared to be approached by the paradox. 
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Does Kierkegaard say to his reader at this point? 11 I have 
patiently brought you this far toward understanding the truth of Christi-
anity. I am the purveyor of the truth of the Paradox and you are the 
Reason. If you are unable to go on with me I am not at fault but I will 
continue to offer assistance . But if you, the Reason, are offended and 
blame me , the purveyor , how can I go f1.1rther until you are ready for a 
happy encounter?" 
It seems to the writer that such an illusion clarifies the nature 
of the authorship and was made by Kierkegaard with intent and for a 
purpose . Not only is the nature of the a thorship clarified but also the 
idea is evidenced that Kierkegaard is a martyr, and that the drive which 
caused him to begin his authorship was an intense one . 
11All that the offended consciousness has to say about the Paradox 
it has l earned from the Paradox, though it would like to pose as the 
discoverer, making use of an acoustic illusion. 1126 
Here , t oo, Ki erkegaard humorously shows the ingratitude of the 
offended consciousness which prefers to hold a smug appraisal of its 
own value. This clarifies the ambivalent idea of contrary identity 
s i nce Kierkegaard, rather than having a divine identity or a human 
26 Ibid., p. 42. 
identity becomes the instrument of the compromise and in linking the 
cont radictories as a purveyor of the divine demonstration becomes part 
of each. 
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The Moment i s fur ther enlarged upon by Kierkegaard in a chapter 
"The Case of the Contemporary Disciple, 11 which concerns the individual 
who lived during the life of Christ . All others are referred to as dis-
ciples at second hand. 
God has made his appearance as Teacher and has assumed the form 
of a servant. His presence in human form, Kierkegaard feels is essential 
to his teaching and is by itself the teaching. The love of the disciple 
is the one purpose of the Teacher . This high mission will be enough to 
attract the attention of the multitude, among whom the learner will un-
doubtedly be found . 
The obvious relationship here is -' he man-God relationship joined 
by Christ who is love o 
For the learner the knowledge that God's appearance in humble form 
is an occasion of the beginning of eternity. The learner who is the con-
temporary disciple, is contemporary with that historical phenomenon which 
refuses to be reduced to a moment of merely occasional significance but 
presents itself as an occasion for his eternal happiness . 
The contemporary learner finds it easy to acquire adequate historical 
information, but with respect to the Teacher's birth he will be in the 
same position as the disciple at second hand. The only human being who 
is fully informed is the woman of whom he permitted himself to be born. 
The true disciple, however , finds it inadequate to consider the 
Teacher as an historical event or as a mere occasion by which he came 
t o an understanding of himself,.. The relationship of owing all to the 
Teacher cannot be attained without Faith, whose object is the Paradox •. 
n • •• the Paradox unites the contradictories, and is the historical 
made eternal and the eternal made h:i.storica1 .,n27 
42 
Here is the relationship again with Faith connecting the histori-
cal and being approached by the eternal in conjunction with the histori-
cal. The Socratic paradox is resolved here and is shown not to be 
absolute . But since Kierkegaard never professed to be an advocate of 
the doctrine of Recollection the paradox from the Kierkegaardian view-
point is strengthened. Fur thermore the reader is sure to be startled 
when the master of dialectic, Socrates, is sho1~1 to be in error by 
Kierkegaard . 
Kierkegaard states that faith is 1either a form of knowledge nor 
an act of will . In the absence of the Teacher, concrete evidences of 
hi s existence are unimportant and unessential, The learner becomes a 
believer or disciple when the Reason is set aside and he receives the 
condition in the Moment. This condition conditions the understanding of 
the eternal and is received in the Moment from the Teacher himselfo 
Faith, then, Kierkegaard concludes , is as paradoxical as the Paradox and 
is a miracle too . 
The l earner and the believer are connected by the Moment which 
identifies with the Paradox and with Faith., 
27 Ibi d., p ., 49. 
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The problem of the historical immediacy between the time of the 
contemporary disciple and the disciple at second hand is considered. In 
regard to the question of becoming, Kierkegaard advances the question, 
"How does that which comes into being change or what is the nature of 
the change involved in becoming? 11 If the subject of becoming does not 
remain unchanged in the process of becoming, it is not the subject which 
comes into being but some other thing. If a plan, in corning into being 
is changed in itself, it is not this plan that comes into being. If it 
comes into being unchanged, a question arises as to the nature of the 
change by which it comes into being . The change is a change in being 
rather than in essence and involves a change from not being to beinge 
The change involved is a transition from possibility to actualityo 
Kierkegaard in explaining the change from possibility to actuality 
may be again pointing out a relationshir in his relationships~ That is, 
all change from the lesser of the contradictories gives them the quality 
of possibility which through change becomes actuality. The change in-
volved is the connection of the possibilities toward the actualities by 
the intervention of a quality designed toward that connection. Here 
there seems to be an allusion again that Kierkegaard is a purveyor to 
connect the contradiction between possibility and actuality. 
The necessary, therefore, cannot come into existence, since be-
coming is a change, and the necessary is always related to itself in the 
same manner . 11Everything that comes into being proves precisely by coming 
into being that it is not necessary; for the necessary is the only thing 
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that cannot come into being, because the necessary is . 1128 Nothing exists 
because it is necessary but the necessary is because it is necessary or 
because the necessary is . The necessary is absolutely different from the 
actual and the possible. God is the necessary being. 
The change involved in becoming is an actual change; the tran-
sition takes place with freedom~ Becoming is never necessary. It 
was not necessary before it came into being , for then it could not 
come into being;
2
nor after it came into being, for then it has not 
come into being. 9 
In ruling out necessity as not coming into being Kierkegaard 
identifies becoming with the progression pointed out in the relation-
ships . Freedom is advanced as the connective quality of becoming which 
becomes through a cause . Freedom, too, is a requisite of the connection 
of the contradictories in the relationships . Force is never a part of 
the relationships, just as force is not a part of the authorship of 
Kierkegaard. 
All becorYJing, then, takes place with freedom and only through the 
operation-of a cause . The illusion is that the becoming is made to seem 
necessary. Actually as the causes have themselves come into being they 
ultimately refer back to a free cause . 
Everything that comes into being, Kierkegaard continues, is his-
torical and that whose becoming is a simultaneous becoming, has no other 
history. The historical is the pas t . The eternal is the only existence 
that has no history. 
28 Ibi d., p . 60 f . 
29 Ibid., p. 61 . 
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The learner is historical or comes into being and is possible; 
the believer is eternal and actual. All are connected by Faith in the 
Moment and the paradox is arbi trarj_ly held or discarded by the learner 
as he advances and becomes a believer or remains stationary as a learner. 
Freedom is integrated in the connection and give the possible actuality. 
In introducing the concept of freedom, Kierkegaard again leaves the 
reader liable for his own advance but not for his relationship to the 
eternal . The arbitrariness of the paradox remains the choice of the 
reader, according to Kierkegaard. 
Becoming may present the possibility of a second becoming within 
the first becoming. The historical becoming is such a reduplication 
and comes into being by the operation of a relatively free cause, which 
in turn points ultimately to an absolutely free cause. 
11What has happened has happened, aL l cannot be undone; in this 
sense it does not admit of change.,,t30 If the past is conceived of as 
necessary, this can happen only by virtue of forgetting that it has 
come into being . 
The future has not yet happened . But it is not~ that account 
less necessary than the past, since the past did not become necessary 
by coming into being, but on the contrary proved by coming into being 
that it was not necessary. If the past had become necessary, it would 
not be possible to infer the opposite about the future, but it would 
rather follow that the future was also necessary.3l 
If necessity could gain a foothold at a single point, there would 
no longer be any distinguishing point between the past and the future. 
30 Ibid. , p. 63 . 
3l Ibid., P• 63 . 
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To predict the future and to understand the necessity of the pas t is the 
sa.l)le thing. 
The paradox, then, appears to be illustrated for the purpose of 
showing that the historical cannot exist except for the perception of 
Faith and once Faith has been attained, the historical is lost in the 
consequence of the eternal. Kierkegaard in relation to his reader again 
indicates that he is a stepping stone for the purpose of an eternal 
consequence. 
Since nature has only an immediate existence, the essentially 
historical is always the past and has as past its own actuality for the 
fact that it has happened is certain and dependable. However, the fact 
that it has happened is the ground of an uncertainty by which the 
apprehension will always be prevented from assimilating the past. The 
past can be understood only in terms of this conflict betweeen certainty 
and uncertainty which is the distinguishing mark of all that has come 
into being as well as of the paste 
He concludes by sayi.ng that the direct form of the historical 
cannot exist for immediate sensation for either a contempor ary or a 
successor. The historical fact which is the content of the hypothesis 
that God has been in existence, exists only for the apprehension of faith . 
The Concluding Unscientific Postscript further enlarges on the 
historical question of Christianity . He states that the paradoxical 
character of Christianity uses t ime and the historical in relation to 
the eternal. The transition from historical account to eternal decision 
involves an attempt to create a quantitative transition to a qualitative 
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decision. He states also that the Fragments seek to show that there 
can be no direct transition from the historical to the eternal r egard-
less of whether the historical is contemporary . The transition by which 
something historical and the relationship t o it become decisive for an 
eternal happiness is a passing to another realm of t hought , that is---a 
The leap referred to at this point and the Moment discussed in 
the Fragments seem to mean the same thing from all outward appear ances. 
The historical and the eternal are connected by a l eap, which fits into 
the pattern as did the Moment and Faith. A new realm of thought is 
reached discounting the historical beginning. In all of Kierkegaard 's 
relationships, the contradictories have been contradictory and as the 
diff erence between Reason and the Unknown when hel d, become an arbitrary 
act, so the difference between the hi t orical and the eternal may also be 
an arbitrary act. The occasion has been given through Kierkegaard as 
purveyor of the truth. It remains for the reader to act arbitr aril y in 
one direction or the other. 
The Fragments took its point of departure, Kierkegaard says in 
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in the pagan consciousness in 
order to seek out experimentally an i nterpretation of exis tence which 
might truly be said to go farther than paganism. The diffi culty in 
present Christianity stems from the fact that Christians are assumed to 
exist from childhood and baptism and are never really sure what it is to 
be a Christian. By assuming the pagan consciousness the learning is 
classified because II . . . it is easier to become a Christian when I am ----------
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not Christian t han t o become Chri sti an when _! one .,1132 
This reaf f irms Kierkegaard ' s assertion of deception which he de-
clared ear lier in the aut hor shi p. Furthermore i t reaffirms his position 
of assuming t he posi t i on of the l earner in showing the progressions 
necessary in becoming a Chris tian. At the same time there is no question 
but that, s ince he is abl e t o cast off the assumption of Christianity, 
he can also t r ace the devel opment of the t r uth of it, if he has had it. 
Kierkegaard follows the historical question in the Philosophical 
Fr agments wit h a discussion of the disciple at second hand . Although 
the first generation s eems to have advantage of an immediate certainty 
or of being near er to the possibility of an exact and reliable account 
of what happened and of being nearer to the shock produced by the impact 
of the fact (referring to the existence of Christ) the advantage and the 
aroused attention are dialectical. 
11 The aroused attention is by no means partial to faith, as if 
faith followed from the attention by a simple consequence . The advan-
tage is that a state of mind is j_nduced in which the crucial nature of 
the decision confronting the individual becomes more clearly evident . 1r33 
This , says Kierkegaard, is the only advantage of any account . 
The l ast generation of secondary disciples, although far removed 
from the initial shock, has the consequences and the proof of probility 
afforded by the resul ts to l ean upon . 
32 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op . cit., p. 327 . 
33 Philos ophical Fragments , op . cit . , p. 78 . 
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But consequences founded on a paradox are humanly speaking built 
over a yawning chasm, and their total content, which can be trans -
mitted to the individual only with the express understanding that 
they rest upon a paradox, are not to be appropriated aj1 a settled 
state, for their entire value trembl es in the balance. 4 
Kierkegaard has said that the solution of the par adox is not im-
portant as l ong as the paradox i s recognized. If the paradox is bridged 
by Faith nothing but the r ecognition of the paradox is necessary. 
The l ast generation (of secondary disciples) has the advantage of 
a greater ease;- but as soon as i t discovers that this ease is pre-
cisely the danger which breeds the difficulty, this new difficulty 
will correspond to the difficulty of the fear confronting the first 
generation, and it will be gripped as primit~~el y by awe and fear as 
the firs t generation of secondary disciples . 
Kierkegaard says that everyone receives from God the condition 
which causes him to become a disciple . A contemporary, then, can only 
aid a successor by i nforming him that he has himself believed in the fact 
and related the content of the past ., He thinks that everyone is endowed 
with possibility and f reedom so t hat whi ch he does with those elements 
is dependent upon him. 
In a final conclusion Kierkegaard asserts that: 
There is no disciple at second hand. The first and the l ast are 
essentially on the same plane, only that a l ater generation finds 
its occasion on the testimony of a contemporary generation, while 
the contemporary generation finds thi s occasion in its own immediate 
contemporaneity , and in so far owes nothing t o anJr other gener ation. 36 
In this declaration Kierkegaard connect s the contemporary and 
secondary generations of disciples as the contradi ctories in the 
34 Ibid. , p. 82 . 
35 Ibid., p. 83 . 
36 Ibid., p. 88 . 
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relationships have been connected. By this affirmation he again throws 
the whole problem of the truth of Christianity back upon the reader in 
an identity with the first generation of disciples . He is indicating 
again the nearness of man to God upon recognition of the paradox and 
discounting the importance of the solution, that is, the disciple is the 




Kierkegaard, in attacking the faulty illusion of Christianity, 
has by his own admission employed the use of shock to dispel the il-
lusion. By saying that Christianity no longer exists he is assured of 
an audience that 1rishes to hear more from the man who says he is not a 
Christian. In telling the reader that God, too, is a deceiver, Kierke-
gaard establishes a divine alibi for his own method of deceit which must 
be acceptable to the reader when he realizes that he has been deceived 
away from error and into the truth. In the Point of View he elucidates ------
the arrangement of his whole authorship and explains his role as a 
deceiver by saying that people should be compelled to take notice. By 
giving the history of the paradoxical quality of his life, enlarging 
upon his dedication to 1the individual' and describing his mode of 
existence during the publication of his aesthetic works, he indicated 
that he was capable of deception as a deliberate technique. 
The deceit which he admitted could hardly be termed as deceit 
after it was admitted; however, throughout the writing, instances have 
been shown which indicate that the method of deceit was carried farther 
than his admission and remained for the reader to discover, if he 
wished to . The additional deceit strengthened the paradoxical pattern 
of his m-iting . 
In the summarization of Philosophical Fragments the problem in-
volved in Christianity has been illustrated 1,tl th emphasis upon the 
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paradoxical relationships . In using the paradox as a device Kierkegaard 
does not say that a solution or resolution is imperative. The learner 
is not asked to understand the Paradox but only to recognize it. The 
recognition takes place 11 0 •• when the Reason and the Paradox encounter 
one another happily in the Moment., when the Reason sets itself aside and 
the Paradox bestows itself. 111 The result is a happy passion called 
Faith. 
The pattern of Kierkegaard 's relationships is shown in the 
following diagram: 
(Man) 





J,., ___ ~--'l 
ur ective 






1 S¢ren Aabye Kierkegaard., Philosophical Fragments . (Princeton~ 
Princeton University Press, 1936), p . 47. 
Three relationships are added later. 
Historical~ / Eternal 
Learner----• (~~!!~t \--t Believer 
Freedom} 
Possibility/ Actuality 
A final relationship which bears upon the total paradoxical re-
lationship problem summarizes the role of Kierkegaard as purveyor of 
truth. 
Reader----~ Kierkegaard ----~Christ 
(authorship) 
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